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Abstract
Background: How should HIV and AIDS resources be allocated to achieve the greatest possible
impact? This paper begins with a theoretical discussion of this issue, describing the key elements of
an "evidence-based allocation strategy". While it is noted that the quality of epidemiological and
economic data remains inadequate to define such an optimal strategy, there do exist tools and
research which can lead countries in a way that they can make allocation decisions. Furthermore,
there are clear indications that most countries are not allocating their HIV and AIDS resources in
a way which is likely to achieve the greatest possible impact. For example, it is noted that
neighboring countries, even when they have a similar prevalence of HIV, nonetheless often allocate
their resources in radically different ways.
These differing allocation patterns appear to be attributable to a number of different issues,
including a lack of data, contradictory results in existing data, a need for overemphasizing a
multisectoral response, a lack of political will, a general inefficiency in the use of resources when
they do get allocated, poor planning and a lack of control over the way resources get allocated.
Methods: There are a number of tools currently available which can improve the resource-
allocation process. Tools such as the Resource Needs Model (RNM) can provide policymakers with
a clearer idea of resource requirements, whereas other tools such as Goals and the Allocation by
Cost-Effectiveness (ABCE) models can provide countries with a clearer vision of how they might
reallocate funds.
Results: Examples from nine different countries provide information about how policymakers are
trying to make their resource-allocation strategies more "evidence based". By identifying the
challenges and successes of these nine countries in making more informed allocation decisions, it
is hoped that future resource-allocation decisions for all countries can be improved.
Conclusion: We discuss the future of resource allocation, noting the types of additional data
which will be required and the improvements in existing tools which could be made.
Background
In 2001, demographers, epidemiologists and economists,
under the direction of the World Health Organization and
UNAIDS, were asked to estimate the resources required to
achieve the newly developed UNGASS targets [1]. The
$9.2 billion projection represented an optimistic estimate
of the level of resources which could be generated by
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2005, considering that the global level of resources for
HIV and AIDS were only $1.6 billion in 2001.
One of the great successes in raising funds for the response
to the HIV and AIDS pandemic has been the rapid
increase in resources for the global response, as shown in
Figure 1. From the UN General Assembly Special Session
on HIV and AIDS in 2001 to the most recent estimates of
global spending in 2007, the level of funding has grown
more than 6 fold to $10 billion [2]. The actual level of
spending in 2005 reached $8.3 billion [2], or 90% of the
resources determined to be required in the original 2001
resource needs estimates. Estimates of global resource
needs have been reassessed on a regular basis. The most
recent assessment projects needs in 2015 of US$22-54 bil-
lion, under three different assumptions about the pace of
scale-up [2].
While no single factor can explain why the growth in
spending has occurred so rapidly, it can be partially
explained by a number of critical events, including:
• The launch of UNAIDS in 1996;
￿ The introduction of the World Bank MAP program,
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in 2000;
￿ The UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV
and AIDS (UNGASS) in 2001;
￿ The start of the Global Fund in 2002;
￿ The launch of PEPFAR in 2003;
￿ The G8 Summit in 2005 and the corresponding com-
mitment to universal access.
While the actual resources spent in 2005 came relatively
close to the target of $9.2 billion, it is important to
remember that the real goal was to scale up the delivery of
services and to change behaviors, not to generate new
resources.
A review of the actual achievements relative to the
expected achievements is not as impressive as the scale up
of resources. The 2006 Report on the Global AIDS Epi-
demic concluded that of 6 targets evaluated, only one was
achieved: the generation of between US$7-$10 billion in
funding by 2005 [3]. For example, one target was to have
90% of young people be able to identify ways of prevent-
ing HIV transmission and to reject major misconceptions
about HIV transmission. On average, only 33% of males
and 20% of females met this requirement in UNGASS
reporting countries; none of the countries were able to
achieve the targeted level of 90% coverage. Another target
was that there would be 80% coverage of PMTCT pro-
grams, a target which was not achieved by any of the
reporting countries in 2005.
Global HIV and AIDS Spending (1987-2007) Figure 1
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The original resource requirement estimates were based
on an assumption that 6 billion condoms would be dis-
tributed annually; by 2005, 5 billion condoms were actu-
ally distributed (83% of the original target) [4]. Reaching
vulnerable populations proved to be more difficult, how-
ever; only 61% of the estimated number of sex workers
targeted were actually reached, while only 37% of those
injecting drug users (IDU) who were assumed to be
reached with the resources were actually reached. Difficul-
ties were also encountered in providing care: only 31% of
those targeted to receive antiretroviral therapy (ART) were
reached and only 28% of the PMTCT target was actually
achieved. The one target that was achieved was the
number of people receiving VCT services, which suc-
ceeded in reaching 185% of the original estimate. In other
words, despite generating 90% of the required resources,
most of the targets used to calculate resource requirements
were not achieved by 2005 [4,5].
Thus, while the global response did succeed in rapidly
generating new resources, it did not succeed in fully gen-
erating the services and the behavior change which was
anticipated. This suggests that either the original projec-
tions were overly optimistic about what could be achieved
with the resources, or the world spent its HIV and AIDS
resources in a much more ineffective (or inefficient) way
than what was originally assumed.
Given the current financial crisis and the potential for
donors to redirect their attention and resources to other
priorities, it is important to assess how current resources
have been spent and ask how resources might be allocated
to assure the achievement of targets in the future. How can
resources be spent to reach those groups most at risk? Will
the allocation of resources be consistent with what is
known about the effectiveness of interventions? Can the
positive response of the past decade be sustained even if
the rapid growth in resources does not continue?
Objective
This paper was developed with three objectives in mind.
The first objective is to identify some of the challenges and
inconsistencies in the ways current HIV and AIDS
resources are allocated at the national level. This section of
the report will define an "evidence-based allocation strat-
egy" and assess if countries are making allocation deci-
sions based on such evidence.
We will also look at how countries are currently spending
their HIV and AIDS resources, with a particular focus on
whether these current allocation patterns appear to be
more driven by politics and wishful thinking, or if they are
more driven by evidence and careful planning. This sec-
tion will also discuss why some countries may not be fol-
lowing an evidence-based allocation strategy.
The second objective is to review some of the national-
level experiences in trying to improve the resource-alloca-
tion process. We will address this objective by identifying
and explaining the experience of groups using evidence-
based tools, such as the Resource Needs Model (RNM) [6]
and the Goals Model [7].
The third objective is to assess how resource allocation in
the future might be improved through encouraging coun-
tries to pursue an "evidence-based allocation strategy".
This section also discusses how current and future tools
might be improved to address the growing need for better
resource allocation.
What is an evidence-based allocation strategy?
The simplest definition of an "evidence-based allocation
strategy" is one in which resources are spent in a way that
is, based on the best currently available evidence, likely to
achieve the greatest possible result. In the case of HIV and
AIDS, results are generally defined in terms of preventing
new infections, providing care and treatment, and mitigat-
ing impact.
How should HIV and AIDS resources be spent?
An ideal approach for assessing how policymakers should
optimally allocate resources would involve comparing a
country's actual spending patterns on HIV and AIDS to
some known optimal allocation pattern. Countries which
differed significantly from the optimal allocation pattern
would be considered to need to reallocate their funds.
Countries closest to the optimal allocation would be the
ones which would not need to reallocate (and presumably
would be provided with more money by donors in recog-
nition of allocating their resources effectively).
For example, perhaps Country A is currently spending
only 2% of its HIV and AIDS prevention resources on
reaching injecting drug users (IDU). The country's 5 year
HIV and AIDS strategy indicates that IDU are not a prior-
ity and will continue to receive only a small proportion of
all prevention resources. However, the optimal allocation
pattern suggests that IDU are an important driver of the
epidemic and Country A should be spending more than
20% of its resources on this population. In this case, pol-
icymakers might be encouraged to rethink their plans and
increase spending on this critical subpopulation. If the
misallocation was not corrected, the country might
receive less money from international donors in the
future, since the country is not allocating its resources
effectively
"Many governments have not acted in a fully responsive
manner to protect their populations from HIV infection or
death from HIV disease. Many countries, rich and poor,
still fail to devote adequate resources to address theirBMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S4
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national epidemics, choose not to implement evidence-
based programming, or ignore the needs of marginalized
groups affected by HIV" [8].
Alternatively, Country B has pursued an "evidence-based
allocation strategy", carefully assessing its epidemic, the
cost-effectiveness of its interventions, synergies between
interventions, the policy environment, etc. Using this evi-
dence, Country B has established clear and logical priori-
ties and has allocated its resources accordingly. In this
case, donors may choose to assign more funds to Country
B, because that country is more likely to have an impact
on its epidemic.
Unfortunately at this time, calculating this optimal alloca-
tion pattern is not entirely feasible, in part because there
is no known optimal allocation of HIV and AIDS
resources [9]. With the availability of better prospective
information on spending patterns and HIV prevalence, it
may become possible in the near future to design optimal
allocation strategies, based on what has worked to reduce
prevalence/incidence, increase treatment, and minimize
the impact of HIV and AIDS. Even if an optimal allocation
pattern did exist, it would need to be significantly modi-
fied for each individual country to reflect differences in
HIV prevalence and/or incidence levels, modes of HIV
transmission and unit costs.
Even countries with similar epidemics, similar modes of
transmission and similar unit costs might choose to allo-
cate their resources in different ways due to cultural and
political differences (e.g., some countries might place a
higher weight on equity, for example, while other coun-
tries might emphasize cost-effectiveness). This is not to
suggest that making decisions based on the political real-
ity which exists in a country is wrong. In fact, in countries
where behaviors such as homosexuality are illegal, it is
particularly problematic to design programs which will
successfully reach MSM. In this case, it might make more
sense to first spend the limited resources to address the
legal environment and then to scale up resources for
MSM.
However, even considering the current lack of data, one
would still expect some consistency in the way resources
are allocated, based on the epidemiological and economic
data available. If resource-allocation decisions are actually
being informed by an evidence-based allocation strategy
rather than being made randomly or based on purely
political factors, then one might expect that neighboring
countries, with a similar prevalence of HIV, would allo-
cate their resources in somewhat similar patterns. Is this
the case?
How are resources currently being spent?
With the advent of National AIDS Spending Assessments
(NASA), much more is currently known about the ways in
which HIV and AIDS resources are being spent [10]. The
2008 UNAIDS Global Report on the epidemic provides an
informative, albeit imperfect, summary of HIV and AIDS
spending from country to country [11]. This provides a
unique opportunity to analyze for the first time how HIV
Allocation of HIV/AIDS Resources in sub-Saharan Africa Figure 2
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and AIDS resources are currently being spent. Is money
being spent on those interventions which will achieve the
greatest possible impact, or are the resources being ran-
domly allocated to various interventions, based on the
hope that everything will have some impact?
Figure 2 shows the reported expenditure of HIV and AIDS
funds in sub-Saharan Africa. The list of countries is
ordered from the lowest prevalence country (Madagascar,
with an adult prevalence of 0.1%) to the highest preva-
lence country (Swaziland, with an adult prevalence of
26.1%). Note that Figures 2, 3 and 4 were developed to
show the proportions of all resources spent on different
interventions. The graphs don't show the absolute
amount of spending, which may influence how countries
allocate their funds.
As the figure shows, lower prevalence countries allocate a
higher proportion of their resources to prevention, while
higher prevalence countries spend a larger percentage on
care and treatment. For example, the eight countries with
prevalence below 2% spend 38% of their resources on
prevention, and only 23% on care and treatment. Mean-
while, the five countries with a prevalence of over 15%
spend 17% of their resources on prevention and 48% on
care and treatment. This allocation is consistent with what
one might expect; low-prevalence countries have a lower
burden of treatment and therefore allocate a greater share
of their resources to prevention. High-prevalence coun-
tries should be spending heavily on prevention but will
have much greater need for treatment. "Other HIV expen-
ditures" in Figures 2 and 3 include human resources,
social protection and social services, an enabling environ-
ment and research.
However, it is also worth noting that there appear to be
some significant outliers. For example, the DRC reports
spending 32% of its resources on administration, almost
twice as much as the average for all 23 countries. Ghana,
with a prevalence of only 1.9%, reports spending the high-
est proportion of any country on care and treatment (69%
of all resources). Even when comparing two high-preva-
lence countries, such as Botswana (prevalence of 24%)
and Swaziland (prevalence of 26%), the resource-alloca-
tion patterns differ significantly. Botswana is currently
spending the largest proportion of its resources on care
and treatment, while Swaziland is spending most of its
resources on orphans and vulnerable children. As a result,
Botswana has 76% coverage with ART in 2006, while Swa-
ziland had only 35% ART coverage [11].
The allocation of resources appears to be even more ran-
dom in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as shown in Fig-
ure 3. The lowest prevalence country, Croatia, spends the
largest proportion of its funds on care and treatment,
which is contrary to what would be expected. Moving
from the lowest prevalence countries on the left to the
highest prevalence countries in the region on the right,
there appears to be little consistency or pattern in the way
resources are spent. Even neighboring countries with a
Distribution of HIV Expenditures in Eastern Europe/Central Asia Figure 3
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similar prevalence of HIV, such as Kazakhstan and Kyr-
gyzstan, spend their HIV and AIDS resources in radically
different ways. Kazakhstan spends most of its resources on
program support, whereas Kyrgyzstan spends most of its
resources on prevention.
The analysis becomes even more revealing when specifi-
cally evaluating the allocation of resources on prevention
programs. In Figure 4, sub-Saharan countries are again
arranged from the lowest-prevalence countries on the left
to the highest prevalence countries on the right. In this
case, the allocation of prevention resources appears to
occur in a random pattern. Again looking at the two high-
est prevalence countries, Botswana and Swaziland, the
approach to allocating prevention resources appears to be
markedly different. In the case of Botswana, most preven-
tion resources are spent on PMTCT, whereas Swaziland
appears to spend a small proportion of its resources on
this intervention. On the other hand, Swaziland appears
to spend most of its resources on BCC and VCT, two inter-
ventions which are allocated a much smaller proportion
of all resources in Botswana.
There are also numerous examples cited of misallocations
of funds in Asia, as reported in Elizabeth Pisani's book
"The Wisdom of Whores" [12]. For example, in China,
90% of HIV transmission is attributable to MSM or IDU,
yet 54% of all donor prevention money is allocated to the
"general population".
National policymakers are not the only stakeholders who
appear to misallocate funds. In Accra, Ghana, for exam-
ple, it has been estimated that 76% of all new HIV infec-
tions occur between sex workers and their partners, while
the remaining 24% of all new infections occur within the
general population [13]. However, the World Bank MAP
program in Ghana estimates that it spends only 0.8% of
its resources on sex worker interventions and spends
99.2% of HIV and AIDS resources on the general popula-
tion [14]. These data suggest that donors, at least in the
case of Ghana, also apparently failed to allocate their own
resources based on evidence regarding the main drivers of
the epidemic.
One caveat is worth noting in regards to the appropriate
allocation of funds. If the cost to reach the general popu-
lation and to change their behavior is much higher than
the cost of reaching and changing the behavior of sex
workers, it may be quite logical to allocate more funds to
the general population than sex workers. In other words,
an appropriate allocation of funds takes into considera-
tion not only where new HIV infections are occurring, but
also considers unit costs of reaching each population.
Reviewing the ways in which countries allocate their
resources, it becomes difficult to demonstrate that coun-
tries are actually pursuing an "evidence-based allocation
strategy". Neighboring countries with similar HIV preva-
lence levels spend resources in radically different ways.
Allocation of Prevention Resources in sub-Saharan Africa Figure 4
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Spending patterns appear to be only nominally related to
the severity of the epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa, and are
totally unrelated to prevalence in the rest of the world.
Prevention resources appear to be allocated randomly,
with no evidence showing that countries allocate their
spending based on evidence about the source of new HIV
infections.
Why don't countries allocate resources based on evidence?
If countries are not pursuing an "evidence based alloca-
tion strategy", the next question is to ask why. A number
of possible explanations are listed below.
Lack of data
One possible explanation for poor resource allocation is
that countries don't have access to the information
required to make rational decisions regarding the alloca-
tion of HIV and AIDS funds. This is a very plausible expla-
nation, given that most countries don't have access to data
about the cost-effectiveness of different interventions.
While there are data which suggest that some interven-
tions may be more cost-effective than others [15-17],
these data are often inadequate for the purpose of policy-
makers. For example, some studies were conducted in one
region, while policymakers in a second region are hesitant
to accept these data as being applicable.
However, the lack of data cannot fully explain the path
some countries take in allocating resources. Even when
data are available and reliable, it has been our experience
that they are only used to a limited extent when make
planning decisions.
Contradictory results
When effectiveness and/or cost-effectiveness data do
become available, there are often contradictory messages
derived from these results. For example, early economic
analysis suggested that PMTCT interventions would not
be affordable in South Africa [18]. Subsequent analyses
concluded that not only would PMTCT be affordable, but
it would also be cost-effective and potentially cost-savings
in South Africa [19-21].
Retrospective data from Uganda about the country's suc-
cess in reducing HIV prevalence rate also has produced
contradictory results. In some cases, it has been suggested
that prevalence reductions were attributable to behavior
change which occurred as a result of a rapidly scaled-up
VCT program [22]. However, other studies have suggested
that prevalence reductions occurred as a result of the
country's "zero grazing" campaign [23]. Still other studies
suggest that the initial behavior change didn't occur
because of any intervention, but because of the response
of Ugandans to observed deaths [24].
Data about the effectiveness of STI treatment has also
demonstrated mixed results. On the one hand, an early
randomized control trial suggested that STI treatment
would have a significant impact on the prevalence of HIV
[25]. However, subsequent studies suggested that this
impact was much less than previously anticipated [26].
Other analyses have produced contradictory results about
where current infections are actually occurring. In Zam-
bia, for example, it has been argued that commercial sex is
not a significant driver of that country's epidemic, with
only 7% of new infections occurring among traditional
vulnerable groups (sex workers, clients, truck drivers and
uniformed services). The Goals model analysis, however,
indicated that commercial sex represents a much more
significant problem, with 21% of all new HIV infections
within this population [27].
Contradictory results have also been reported in Uganda,
where David Wilson of the World Bank has argued that
65% of all new infections occur among married couples,
thus justifying an allocation of resources which is more
generalized [14]. However, David Apuuli of Uganda's
AIDS Commission argues that sex work still represents a
major mode of transmission, thus justifying a more tar-
geted approach and a more focused allocation of
resources [28]. These results leave policymakers with
uncertainty about where new HIV infections will actually
occur and how best to allocate limited resources.
Multisectoral response
A third possible explanation why resources are not better
focused on key interventions is that HIV and AIDS is
viewed as a disease requiring a multisectoral response. An
example of this argument is contained in the statement
below, from the Tanzanian National Strategic Plan (NSP)
(2003-2007).
"All major elements of the National Response have to be in
place if the response is likely to achieve its desired impact.
The NMSF does not attempt to prioritize among those
objectives or strategies. It insists on the comprehensiveness
of the response, knowing that due to preferences, experi-
ences, resources available, etc. priorities will have to be
established in distinct areas once Operational Plans and
Activities are developed. It is one of the most important
tasks of TACAIDS as the main guardian of the National
Response to ensure that all areas are covered and balances
between the areas are maintained or (re-) established"
[29].
This perspective has merit for a number of reasons. It has
been shown that a multisectoral response not only gener-
ates more resources, but also takes advantage of synergies
which can exist when people are approached with HIVBMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S4
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and AIDS messages from varying sources (e.g., mass
media, peer education, etc.) [30]. An approach which sug-
gests that a country should spend all of its resources on
one intervention (e.g., condoms) is unlikely to produce
the same benefits as a holistic program which focuses on
a wide variety of interventions. Thus, STI treatment, con-
dom distribution, ART, and stigma and discrimination
interventions (among other interventions) are likely to
have synergistic benefits which could not be achieved if a
country merely spent all of its resources on a single, prior-
itized intervention.
This argument, however, must be balanced against the
temptation to scatter resources across all interventions,
with little or no priority given to those interventions likely
to produce the greatest possible impact. As illustrated by
the 1998 UNAIDS Strategic Planning Guidelines, coun-
tries should avoid the temptation of using a multisectoral
process as an excuse to avoid prioritization.
"The complexities of HIV sometimes have led governments
to attempt planning for all eventualities. Moreover, donors
and other external agencies have frequently added their
own agendas to already unwieldy plans that cover many
areas, resulting in generally low implementation rates, poor
performance, and overburdening of scarce national staff. A
more strategic approach concentrates on planning in prior-
ity areas, through identifying the epidemic's most important
determinants" [31].
Political will
Another explanation for why countries don't allocate
resources using an evidence-based approach is that coun-
tries lack the political will or support to address particular
risk groups (for example, see "The Wisdom of Whores",
for an extensive explanation of why IDU are seldom
reached in Asia, despite their acute vulnerability to HIV)
[12]. In many countries in Latin America and the Carib-
bean, for example, the epidemic pattern suggests that the
top-priority population group should be MSM. However,
in much of Latin America, there is little support for spend-
ing resources on MSM, and thus policymakers may decide
to instead focus their resources on addressing the general
population.
Figure 5 confirms that MSM represent a large proportion
of all AIDS cases in most of Latin America (in Costa Rica,
for example, MSM represent more than 60% of all AIDS
cases). However, the graphic shows that most prevention
resources are not focused on MSM. In fact, in every coun-
try except Peru, the analysis suggests that resources are dis-
proportionately small compared to the impact that MSM
represent in terms of AIDS cases. In this case, it appears
that resources are not being allocated where they can have
the greatest possible impact.
The argument about spending resources on the general
population rather than already stigmatized groups does
have some merit. By focusing attention on MSM, for
AIDS Spending on MSM Relative to MSM Cases Figure 5
AIDS Spending on MSM Relative to MSM Cases.BMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S4
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example, as a primary target population in Latin America,
there is a possible risk that MSM would become further
stigmatized and blamed for spreading the epidemic. How-
ever, a country's national strategic goals are unlikely to be
achieved if a predominance of resources is being spent on
interventions that focus on relatively low-risk popula-
tions, rather than on those subpopulations where the epi-
demic is actually spreading.
Inefficiency
Another possible explanation for why resources are not
achieving the expected outputs is that the money is spent
on interventions that are delivered inefficiently [9]. Thus,
an intervention like voluntary counseling and testing
(VCT) may be shown to be highly cost-effective under cer-
tain conditions. However, when the resources are actually
allocated to those organizations which deliver VCT serv-
ices, these services are implemented inefficiently, result-
ing in a less-effective intervention and a poor allocation of
resources.
Poor planning
In a number of cases, a poor allocation of resources occurs
as a result of poor planning. As has already been noted,
countries such as Tanzania have avoided explicitly priori-
tizing interventions in their strategic plan, and have
instead passed this responsibility on to their AIDS pro-
gram [29]. Other countries, such as Nicaragua, identify so
many prioritized populations in their strategic plan that
the prioritization essentially becomes meaningless (Nica-
ragua identifies 11 populations in their plan, including
young people, children exploited by violence, children
exploited by sex, MSM, sex workers, mobile populations,
prisoners, uniformed services, pregnant women, indige-
nous populations, and orphans) [32]. Other NSPs, such
as those from Myanmar, prioritize "men and women of
reproductive age", which covers such a large proportion of
the entire population that it essentially eliminates any pri-
oritization at all [33].
It is also not uncommon to find NSPs which prioritize cer-
tain interventions or populations, but then allocates the
largest share of funds to interventions which are not pri-
oritized. In Kenya, for example, the Ministry of Health's
1999-2004 HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan indicated that the
largest part of the budget should be for the procurement
and distribution of STD drugs, even though the plan itself
did not emphasize STD drug procurement as a priority in
the plan [34].
Lack of control over resources
Another possible reason why resources may not be allo-
cated to produce the greatest possible impact is that the
country itself cannot control how resources are being
spent. For example, some international donors such as
PEPFAR have their own agenda to fulfill in regards to allo-
cating resources. In this case, recipient countries are likely
to be hesitant to turn down resources, even if those
resources will skew the national response towards inter-
ventions which planners don't believe will be successful.
In conclusion, there are various reasons why countries
may not pursue an "evidence-based allocation strategy".
The most common reasons include a lack of data, contra-
dictory results from research, the perceived need for a
broad, multisectoral response, various political factors
and inefficiency. Each of these reasons has some validity,
yet the overall result is that resources are being spent in a
way that does not maximize the impact of resources being
spent. The next section, therefore, addresses how some
countries have used evidence-based tools to better allo-
cate available resources.
Description of costing and resource-allocation 
models
As described previously, there are various reasons why
resources are not spent more strategically or based on the
growing evidence about how best to allocate resources.
The following section will review some of the experiences
of countries that have tried to improve their resource-allo-
cation strategy.
Determining resource requirements
While determining resource requirements may be an
ongoing process for most countries, the challenge of esti-
mating resource needs becomes most acute when a coun-
try is either designing a new (typically 5-year) HIV and
AIDS strategic plan or developing a request for resources
from donors (most typically the Global Fund).
Unfortunately, the costing of a strategic plan or a Global
Fund proposal is usually conducted after all decisions
about strategies and priorities have already been made.
Thus, the costing usually entails putting a monetary figure
on decisions that have already been made, with little or no
discussion about how different strategies or priorities may
or may not be feasible given the available resources.
The Resource Needs Model (RNM) has been widely used
to encourage countries to develop costed plans which are
evidence-based [6]. The prevention component of RNM
provides a set of global default-unit-cost estimates, which
the user is encouraged to modify for their own particular
country. RNM also requires users to estimate the size of
their target populations and the baseline and planned
coverage for their target populations.
Without careful consideration of feasibility, a strategic
plan can quickly become a "wish list". An example of this
is Zambia's Round 5 Global Fund application. In 2005,BMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S4
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Zambia unsuccessfully requested US$1 billion over 5
years from the Global Fund. As it turned out, the 26 coun-
tries which did receive immediate approval for their Glo-
bal Fund applications had requested a cumulative total of
$977 million over 5 years. In other words, Zambia had
requested funds greater than the combined amount
requested by the 26 countries with successful applica-
tions. While Zambia is a country that is severely affected
by HIV and AIDS, their "wish list" approach to costing its
Global Fund proposal concluded with a failure of the
country to obtain any HIV and AIDS funds in Round 5.
In the case of South Africa's 2007-2011 NSP, the esti-
mated resource requirements from domestic and interna-
tional sources were calculated to be R45 billion
(approximately US$4.6 billion) [35]. While this seems
like a potentially unrealistic target, data from 2007 suggest
the country is actually quite close to meeting their first
resource-generation target. In 2007, South Africa gener-
ated 96% of the NSPs resource requirements (R4.5 bil-
lion, up from R4.3 billion in 2006).
However, the resources required are calculated to rise
from R4.7 billion in 2007 to R11.3 billion in 2011. South
Africa's NSP calls for a 36% increase in spending in 2008
and a 140% increase in spending overall between 2007
and 2011. Thus, South Africa will need to continue to
make a substantial increase in its effort to generate new
resources and meet the resource generation targets that
the plan defines. Is South Africa's NSP a "wish list" or a
'feasible plan"? Only time will tell.
Allocating scarce resources
When most strategic plans are costed, there is little or no
effort to assess what would happen if the levels of
resources do not become available. A costed strategic plan
should ideally consider alternative scenarios, aligning the
priorities to assumptions about various levels of funding
actually becoming available. A country, for example,
might cost its strategic plan at $2 billion over 5 years, but
then quickly realize that the level of funding for the pro-
gram is unlikely to exceed $1 billion. Should the country
cut all of its targets in half? Are there ways to reallocate
funds to ensure that the targets can still be achieved
despite the limited funds? Which budgetary items are the
most critical and therefore should be fully funded, as
opposed to those items which are important but not crit-
ical?
The Goals model is a key tool in HIV-related strategic
planning, evaluation and proposal development. The
Goals model is a resource-allocation tool that has been
used to answer the following types of questions:
￿ What resources are required to expand coverage of
prevention, care, treatment and mitigation services to
all who need them?
￿ What goals can be achieved with the available
resources?
￿ How can resources be allocated most efficiently to
provide the greatest benefit?
￿ What is the gap between resources required and
those available?
￿ What will be the impact of cuts in current levels of
funding?
The Goals model allows users to test alternative patterns
of resource allocation and observe how these decisions are
likely to affect the overall achievement of specific targets.
For example, countries can assess if spending more money
on interventions with sex workers is likely to have a
greater or lesser impact on the prevalence and incidence of
HIV than interventions focused on youth.
One challenge with the Goals model, as with all models,
is that they can only be effectively used in policymaking
with up to date and accurate input data. This is particu-
larly important because it has been observed that the HIV
epidemic rapidly evolves. As shown in Figure 6, Brazil ini-
tially had an epidemic that was predominantly driven by
injecting drug users. However, by 1992, the epidemic
among IDU had peaked. Today it is estimated that most
new HIV infections are occurring among MSM and sex
workers [36].
Thus, if a country is responding to their epidemic using
outdated epidemiological information, they are likely to
find that their resource-allocation strategy is highly inef-
fective. Old data from Brazil, for example, would suggest
that interventions should be focused on IDU, while more
recent data would indicate that more resources should be
spent on MSM.
While later sections will focus largely on the experience of
countries in using the Goals model, it is worth noting that
other resource-allocation models exist and have been
applied. These include the ABCE model, an optimization
model which focuses on identifying the most cost-effec-
tive prevention interventions [37]. ABCE was developed
by the World Bank and applied in a number of countries,
including India, Honduras and Brazil.
The S4HARA model was developed for the purpose of
expanding resource-allocation decisions beyond factors of
efficiency, but also tries to take into consideration non-BMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S4
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quantifiable factors such as equity [38]. This model has
been applied in a South African health clinic, with the
result that the authors recommended an increased effort
to promote condoms at this site.
Experience with one resource-allocation tool
The Goals model has been used to improve the resource-
allocation process in seventeen countries since 2002,
including eight of the fifteen PEPFAR countries. Of the
seventeen countries where the Goals model has been
used, twelve are in Africa, three are in Asia and two are in
Latin America: Uganda, Lesotho, Kenya, South Africa,
Ghana, Ethiopia, Namibia, Zambia, Mozambique,
Rwanda, Malawi, Mali, Honduras, Mexico, China, Cam-
bodia, Ukraine. All seventeen applications were con-
ducted between 2002 and 2008, with two countries
(Ethiopia and Kenya) utilizing the model twice.
The following section provides information on resource-
allocation exercises conducted in eight countries between
2002 and 2008 (Uganda, Lesotho, Kenya, South Africa,
Honduras, Namibia, Zambia, Ethiopia and the Ukraine).
These eight country examples were selected and discussed
in this report because of their geographic diversity, as well
as the illustrative "lessons learned" from these examples.
The purpose of this review is to focus on the key experi-
ences from countries which have tried to better allocate
their HIV and AIDS resources.
Lesotho
In 2000, the government of Lesotho completed its 2001-
2003 NSP, which was estimated to cost a total of US$1 bil-
lion, or US$333 million per year [39]. While Lesotho has
an extremely high prevalence of HIV (currently estimated
to be 23%), the size of the population is relatively small
(approximately 2 million). Thus, many of the interna-
tional donors viewed the costed strategic plan to be highly
unrealistic, particularly given that the levels of resources
available in Lesotho were only US$10 million per year at
the time. The Goals model exercise in Lesotho was con-
ducted in 2002, in large part because the NSP was not suc-
cessfully generating the required resources.
By using the Goals model, the costing of the NSP was
revised [40]. Working with a team of local costing experts,
it was possible to revise the budget downwards from
US$333 million annually to US$100 million annually.
This was achieved largely by reevaluating unrealistically
large cost estimates for two interventions: STI treatment
and the distribution of pamphlets.
A new priority setting team was then developed and
assigned responsibility for ensuring that the budget was
consistent with the NSP. The team identified interven-
tions that could achieve their goals at a much lower cost.
For example, the priority setting team noted that the
budget for community mobilization was excessive and
they were able to propose changes which would make this
intervention much less costly. By identifying those items
Source of New HIV Infections in Brazil Figure 6
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which were most critical for Lesotho's national response,
it was possible to develop a new budget of approximately
US$40 million per year, or 12% of the original costing.
This new costed plan may have appeared to be less ambi-
tious, but in reality it still represented a 4-fold increase in
spending. As a result, Lesotho was able to use this infor-
mation to successfully apply for additional donor fund-
ing. In 2003 Lesotho requested and received US$29
million in additional HIV and AIDS funds from the Glo-
bal Fund. In 2006, Lesotho received approval for an addi-
tional $40 million of HIV and AIDS funds and in 2008
Lesotho successfully requested another US$33 million.
The key lesson learned from this resource-allocation exer-
cise appears to be that developing more realistic, yet still
ambitious, budgets is likely to produce more funds than
developing a "wish list" approach to resource allocation.
The Goals model was successful in getting policymakers
from Lesotho to recognize that HIV and AIDS spending
remains limited, and therefore a more prioritized
resource-allocation strategy was required. As a result,
Lesotho was successful both in prioritizing and generating
new resources.
Kenya
The Goals model was used in Kenya both in 2002 and in
2004 [41,42]. The 2002 application was conducted as part
of the country's Joint AIDS Program Review. The 2002
application provided the country with an analysis with
recommendations both for generating new resources and
reallocating current resources. Kenya's NSP (2000-2005)
indicated that the country hoped to reduce HIV preva-
lence by 20% to 30% among those 15 to 24 years old [43].
The country estimated that existing commitments from
donors and the Kenyan government amounted to approx-
imately US$710 million over 5 years.
The modeling exercise revealed that Kenya's HIV and
AIDS response was succeeding at reducing HIV preva-
lence, but that the reductions were probably not going to
reach the expected 20%-30% target by 2005. The mode-
ling exercise did reveal that the target was still feasible if
the country was able to both reallocate existing resources
and obtain new funds. The allocation exercise indicated
that interventions with sex workers, STI treatment, work-
place interventions and voluntary counseling and testing
were particularly cost-effective. Conversely, there was
much less evidence that interventions such as community
mobilization, outreach to out-of-school youth and mass
media would have much of an impact in reaching Kenya's
targets.
In terms of the country's treatment goals, the modeling
exercise related the country's treatment target for 2005
(60,000 people on ART) to the resources required (esti-
mated to be between US$64 and US$76 million). By cal-
culating more carefully the resource requirements,
Kenyan policymakers were better prepared to assess their
resource needs and to successfully seek out these
resources.
The result of this exercise was that the country was able to
submit a successful Global Fund application which
defined why additional resources were required both for
prevention and treatment. Using data from the Goals
model, the application was also able to more accurately
define what could be achieved with the resources
requested. A total of $107 million was approved in 2003
for Kenya from the Global Fund.
The resource-allocation exercise was less successful at get-
ting the country to reallocate its HIV and AIDS funds. In
many ways, the country viewed the exercise as important
for obtaining additional funds, but less important in
terms of developing priorities and ensuring that those pri-
orities were actually achieved. Furthermore, as new PEP-
FAR funds became available, Kenya appeared to be less
concerned about issues of sustainability.
In 2004, the National AIDS Control Council began prep-
aration of its new strategic plan for 2005-2010. A team
working on resource allocation applied the Goals model
to estimate the resources that would be required to fully
scale up prevention and treatment programs, and the
impact that could be expected if full scale-up were
achieved. Significant effort was put into collecting up-to-
date unit costs for prevention and treatment programs
implemented by the Government of Kenya and by other
implementing organizations. The resulting goals formed
part of the vision statement for the plan. The resources
required exceeded the expected availability of funds and
formed the basis for a renewed effort at resource mobili-
zation.
South Africa
The Goals model application in South Africa was con-
ducted in 2003, half-way through the country's 2000-
2005 NSP [44]. The modeling exercise was pursued to
assess if the country needed to make any modifications in
the way resources were being spent [45].
The analysis did find a number of areas where additional
funds should be spent, including interventions with sex
workers, MSM and IDU. The analysis also showed that
funding for condoms was insufficient, and that the gov-
ernment should allocate additional resources to distribute
additional condoms. The Goals model was also used to
estimate the cost of a national PMTCT program; confirm-
ing previous cost estimates for this intervention. Finally,BMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S4
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the Goals model confirmed that the general provision of
ART would be affordable for the government.
There were numerous positive outcomes based on these
observations. For example, the government prioritized
and allocated additional funds for sex-worker interven-
tions, condom distribution, PMTCT programs and general
ARV access. However, while the government agreed to
research the needs of MSM and IDU in South Africa, they
did not agree to additional funding to reach these popula-
tions. In other words, despite some evidence to the con-
trary, South Africa remained unwilling to address existing
political barriers which limited their ability to work with
sensitive subpopulations such as MSM.
Honduras
In the 2004 Goals model application, an assessment of
the country's NSP (2003-2007) was performed; the model
was used to assess the impact of a potential decision by
the Global Fund to discontinue funding the Honduran
HIV and AIDS program [46]. This application was con-
ducted because there were serious concerns that Global
Fund would discontinue funding in Honduras for its HIV
and AIDS program.
The NSP indicated that Honduras required US$25 million
over the 5-year life of the plan [47]. There was general con-
sensus that the resources budgeted in the country's NSP
were insufficient to achieve the goals established in the
plan. Therefore, various scenarios were evaluated for
developing a more ambitious plan for addressing HIV and
AIDS in Honduras.
An analysis of the resources required to fully cover all HIV
and AIDS services and reach all vulnerable subpopula-
tions indicated that US$285 million would be required
over the 5 years of the plan. This full-coverage scenario
was deemed unlikely to be feasible.
A third scenario was developed which would require that
the Global Fund continue their funding of the Honduras
program. In this scenario, Honduras would have access to
US$58 million over 5 years. This scenario was estimated
to result in a 14% reduction in HIV prevalence and a 51%
reduction in HIV incidence. The expected number of HIV
infections averted was 22,000, at a cost of US$1,100 per
infection averted.
The analysis was effective at demonstrating to the Global
Fund that their contribution to the HIV and AIDS
response was critical and was likely to have significant
benefits, especially in terms of infections averted. As a
result of the analysis, along with various commitments
from the government of Honduras, the Global Fund
decided to continue funding of the Honduran HIV and
AIDS program.
Namibia
A Goals modeling exercise was conducted in Namibia, a
year after the start of their NSP (2004-2009) [48,49].
When Namibia launched its NSP, it lacked information
about its current HIV and AIDS expenditures, although
the country was able to develop an estimate of its resource
needs. By 2005, the country was able to calculate its
resource available at US$79 million, an amount which
was expected to rise to $130 million by 2007. The chal-
lenge for Namibia was that the NSP estimated that the
resources required in 2007 were only $124 million. In
other words, the data appeared to suggest that Namibia
had access to higher levels of resources than were actually
needed in 2007.
The exercise in Namibia was designed to: 1) assess if the
NSP had accurately been costed and 2) to evaluate how
additional resources might be allocated to achieve the
greatest possible impact.
The modeling indicated that a more realistic costing of the
country's NSP would require approximately $175 million
to reach the desired coverage of services. It was deter-
mined that, relative to a scenario of constant funding from
2005 to 2009, HIV incidence would be reduced from
2.26% to 1.63%. The additional funding would result in
more than 16,000 HIV infections averted. The proposed
funding would further decrease HIV prevalence by a small
amount (from 19.3% to 18.6%). The model calculated
that ART coverage could be increased from 21% to 58%.
The exercise in Namibia confirmed what the government
already suspected, which was that the NSP had been sig-
nificantly undercosted. While the government of Namibia
recognized that the Goals model could help to improve
their costing, they did not choose to revise the costing of
the NSP.
Namibia is currently beginning to develop a new NSP,
and have indicated a desire to conduct a new Goals model
application which will improve the country's ability to
devise more tenable cost estimates. Policymakers also
hope that more realistic cost estimates will assist the coun-
try in generating new resources for its NSP and achieve
universal access for prevention and treatment services.
Zambia
In 2005, Zambia requested support in learning about and
utilizing the Goals model [27]. As previously indicated,
Zambia had earlier in the year submitted an unrealisti-
cally ambitious and unprioritized Global Fund applica-
tion. However, at the time of the Goals application inBMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S4
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2005, Zambian policymakers could point to a number of
important successes, including reductions in HIV preva-
lence, increases in condom use and growing access to free
ART throughout the country. Furthermore, Zambia bene-
fitted from a significant growth in the availability of
resources from PEPFAR, the Global Fund and the World
Bank.
Zambia at the time of the Goals application was complet-
ing its HIV and AIDS strategic plan for 2002 to 2005 [50].
It was also in the process of designing its new strategic
plan for 2006 to 2010 [51].
Three scenarios were developed for the Zambian govern-
ment. In the first, universal access would be achieved by
2009 for ARVs, PMTCT and blood screening, but there
would be no additional spending on prevention pro-
grams. This first scenario would require that Zambia
increase its annual HIV and AIDS expenditures from
US$100 million per year in 2004 to US$260 million per
year by 2009. Of this amount, the largest expenditures, by
far, would be on the provision of ART (estimated to cost
US$190 million by 2009). This treatment-intensive sce-
nario would result in HIV prevalence rising, from the pro-
jected prevalence of 13.3% in 2009 to 15.4%. HIV
prevalence rises as ART scale-up occurs due to the
increased life expectancy of those on treatment. However,
this rise in prevalence can in part be counteracted with a
corresponding increase in prevention scale-up.
The second scenario assumed universal access would be
achieved for all prevention, care, treatment and mitiga-
tion interventions by 2009. This full-coverage scenario
resulted in only a slight increase in HIV prevalence
(13.7% in 2009). However, this second scenario was esti-
mated to cost much more than the first scenario (US$442
million in 2009).
The third scenario assumed that the targets for the first sce-
nario would be achieved, but an additional US$30 mil-
lion would be made available for Orphans and
Vulnerable Children (OVC) interventions and the most
cost-effective HIV prevention interventions. This third sce-
nario was projected to result in Zambia spending a total of
US$290 million in 2009, with prevalence rising to 14.2%.
A review of these three scenarios indicates a number of
important observations regarding the allocation of HIV/
AIDS resources in Zambia. Scenario 1 provides some indi-
cation regarding the cost of providing full coverage for the
3 identified services. While this scenario was likely to rep-
resent a significant achievement, it also suggests a concern
because of rising levels of HIV prevalence. While Scenario
2 was likely to produce the best possible results, it
remained unclear if this level of increased funding was
likely to become available. Finally, Scenario 3 suggested
that an allocation of resources which balances prevention,
care and treatment - and invests in those interventions
that are likely to have the largest impact - will probably
produce extremely impressive results, without requiring
the very high costs required of Scenario 2.
While Zambia did not adopt all the conclusions from the
Goals report, Zambia's national strategic plan did indicate
that US$255 million would be required in 2009, an
amount very similar to that calculated in Scenario 1. Fur-
thermore, the strategic plan noted that the "Availability of
ART will decrease the mortality rate and, therefore, in the
short to medium term prevalence could in fact increase as
ART becomes more readily available." A similar conclu-
sion was made from the Goals model exercise, with all
three scenarios resulting in a projected increase in the
prevalence of HIV.
Ethiopia
The Goals model in Ethiopia was first applied in 2006,
sixteen months after the country had launched its 2004-
2008 NSP [52,53]. The Goals model is currently being
updated for use with the upcoming 2009-2013 National
Strategic Plan. While specific data on HIV and AIDS
spending in Ethiopia are not available, it was estimated
that Ethiopia spent approximately US$110 million on
HIV and AIDS interventions in 2005. This level of funding
represents a substantial effort on the part of the Ethiopian
government and international donors. However, this
funding was only enough to achieve relatively low levels
of coverage for most HIV and AIDS services.
The country's 2004-2008 NSP indicated that approxi-
mately US$170 million per year is required to achieve the
desired targets. This would represent an increase of more
than 50% from the estimated 2005 level of resources.
However, the Goals model calculations suggest that this
increase in funding would still not be sufficient to achieve
universal access.
The Goals model exercise in Ethiopia indicated that uni-
versal access (defined as 80% coverage for all services)
could be achieved in 2010 with an 8-fold increase in
spending, reaching US$1 billion per year by 2010. How-
ever, a review of the country's capacity constraints, as well
as access to donor resources, suggested that this type of
rapid growth was unlikely to be achieved in such a short
period of time.
Another scenario reviewed involved prioritizing interven-
tions in the costed strategic plan (to achieve greater cover-
age in certain areas) and also striving for higher levels of
funds. In this scenario, Ethiopia would need to generate
US$300 million in 2010, triple the level of 2005 fundingBMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S4
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but less than a third of the resources required for full cov-
erage. The result would be to decrease prevalence (from
5.3% to 5.1%) and incidence (0.78% to 0.60%) and pro-
vide ART coverage to 230,000 people infected with HIV.
Of all the scenarios, this seemed to be the one which cre-
ated the best combination of feasibility and ambition.
It should be noted that Ethiopia's first Goals model appli-
cation utilized the epidemiological data and prevalence
trends that were available in March 2006. The Goals
model concluded that, without additional behavior
change, prevalence would rise from 4.7% in 2005 to 6.5%
in 2010. However, when the 2005 Demographic and
Health Survey (DHS) and Antenatal Surveillance (ANC)
data became available later in 2006, it revealed that prev-
alence among 15-49 year olds was between 1.4% (DHS)
and 3.5% (ANC), both of which were well below the esti-
mates used in the Goals report. Following an extensive
analysis of the DHS and the ANC data, Ethiopia agreed on
a single point estimate of 2.1%, less than half of the prev-
alence calculated when the first Goals application was per-
formed. Thus, in 2009, the calculations are being revised
and will be used as an input into Ethiopia's next NSP.
There are a number of important lessons learned from this
exercise. First, it appears that the 2004-2008 NSP was not
ambitious enough, despite a projected 50% increase in
the calculation of resources needed. On the other hand,
the resources needed to ensure universal access of services
in Ethiopia ($1 billion in 2010) were determined to be
infeasible, given capacity constraints and an unrealisti-
cally rapid growth in donor funding. Thus, by conducting
a Goals modeling exercise, it was possible to develop a
scenario that would achieve ambitious levels of coverage
while still targeting resource levels that were likely to be
achievable.
Another lesson learned from the Ethiopia exercise
involved the importance of having accurate epidemiolog-
ical data. As noted above, the Goals model was conducted
at a time when it was determined, based on ANC data,
that HIV prevalence was nearly 5%. Subsequent data
obtained from the country's 2005 DHS and ANC data sug-
gest that prevalence was actually closer to 2%. This will
clearly have implications on the resource estimates for
achieving universal (or near universal) access.
Uganda
In 2006, the Uganda AIDS Commission (UAC) began to
prepare its new HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan for the years
2007/8 - 2011/12 [54]. The work began with a review of
the accomplishments and failures of the previous plan,
collection of up-to-date data and a situation analysis. The
costing and resource-allocation work started early in the
process with an assessment of current spending and esti-
mates of future resource requirements. The assessment of
current spending found that resources available for HIV
and AIDS programs had increased from $39 million in
2003/4 to $170 million in 2006/7. The team working on
resource allocation held discussions with donors and the
UAC to estimate the likely future trend in resource availa-
bility. The team developed several future funding scenar-
ios based on a detailed analysis of donor plans and
government budgets. Based on increased funding from
PEPFAR, Global Fund and domestic sources, resources
available were projected to increase to $350-$500 million
per year by the end of the plan.
The team used the Goals model to estimate the future
funding required to scale up coverage of all key preven-
tion, treatment and mitigation interventions to reach full
coverage by the end of the plan [55]. They estimated that
about $620 million would be needed in 2011/12. Thus,
the gap between resources needed and resources expected
to be available was $120-$270 million in 2011/12. Since
it was clear that funds would not be available to scale up
all interventions, decisions needed to be made on what
was most important to fully fund and what would have to
be only partially funded.
The resource-allocation team used the Goals model to
estimate the impact of different allocation scenarios.
Impact was measured by several indicators, including two
for prevention (the number of new infections, the reduc-
tion in annual incidence), two for treatment (ART cover-
age and the number of AIDS deaths) and one for
mitigation (coverage of support services for orphans and
vulnerable children). Several different allocation schemes
were analyzed, including:
￿ Prevention first: fully fund all prevention programs,
allocate the remaining funds to treatment and mitiga-
tion
￿ Cost-effective prevention first: fully fund the most
cost-effective prevention interventions, keep other
prevention constant, allocate the remaining funds to
treatment and mitigation
￿ Treatment first: achieve universal access to treat-
ment, allocate the remaining funds to prevention and
mitigation
￿ Mitigation first: increase funding for OVC programs
by 6-fold, allocate the remaining funds to prevention
and treatment.
Allocation scenarios that prioritized prevention prevented
many new infections but did not have as much impact on
reducing deaths or mitigating the effects on children. Allo-BMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S4
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cating funding to treatment averted the most deaths and
achieved high ART coverage but did not prevent as many
new infections.
This information was presented in meetings with the
UAC, civil society, donors, government departments, and
parliamentary committees. At these meetings, participants
discussed the benefits of each allocation strategy and
voiced their opinions about priorities for the new plan.
This had happened before but what was different this time
was that these discussions were informed by information
on the impact of their decisions on key indicators of
impact. After much discussion, it was decided to give top
priority to fully funding the most cost-effective prevention
strategies.
Ukraine
Ukraine has the most severe epidemic in all of Europe,
with a prevalence estimated to be 1.63% [56]. Estimates
indicate that a third of male mortality and more than half
of female mortality among those between the ages of 15
and 49 in Ukraine will be attributable to AIDS within the
next five years.
Ukraine is preparing for their next HIV and AIDS strategic
plan, which will run from 2009 to 2013. As part of that
preparation, a team applied the Goals model to evaluate a
number of different scenarios. These scenarios include:
1. Constant expenditures: Funding remains constant
from 2008 to 2013.
2. Universal access: Funding increases to achieve uni-
versal access.
3. Prevention focus: Universal access is achieved for
prevention; treatment spending increases by 50%.
4. Treatment focus: Universal access is achieved for
treatment; prevention spending increases 50%.
5. Limited funding: Budget based on the commitment
of the Ministry of Finance and the Global Fund.
Each of these five scenarios was evaluated in terms of cost,
impact on incidence and prevalence, and levels of cover-
age for care and treatment services. The results are shown
in Table 1. Scenario 1 is shown to be the least expensive,
but also achieves the lowest level of coverage for ART and
for prevention coverage (IDU drug substitution coverage
is used as an indicator of prevention success). Scenario 2
is likely to have the greatest impact in terms of both ART
and prevention coverage, but this scenario is the most
expensive. Scenario 3 is likely to have the greatest impact
on HIV prevalence, but it only achieves 44% coverage for
ART. Scenario 4 achieves high level of treatment coverage,
but results in the highest prevalence of HIV. Finally, sce-
nario 5 also reaches high levels of treatment coverage, but
only achieves 38% of IDU with drug substitution pro-
grams.
The result of the exercise was to provide Ukrainian policy-
makers with different scenarios which relate resources to
the achievement of different targets. While the Ministry of
Finance had originally proposed that the country pursue
Scenario 5, there was a recognition following the exercise
that the level of funding was insufficient to achieve the
country's goals. As a result, the Ukrainian Ministry of
Finance agreed to higher levels of government funding. In
addition, the Ukrainian Ministry of Health agreed to con-
duct further negotiations with ARV manufacturers, with
the intent of lowering the price of ARVs in the country.
The future of resource allocation
This final section discusses the possible future of resource
allocation in the field of HIV and AIDS, including
improvements in existing resource-allocation tools, the
improved willingness of countries to link priorities and
resources, the barriers that lie ahead for improving the
resource-allocation process, and some key actions that
could be pursued in the next few years to overcome those
barriers.
How can resource allocation be made better?
There are various ways in which countries can be encour-
aged to think beyond their current paradigm regarding
HIV and AIDS resource allocation. Perhaps the first step in
allocating resources effectively is to ensure that policy-
makers truly understand their own epidemic. In other
Table 1: Scenarios for Resource Allocation
# Scenario Cost in 2013 ART Cov. IDU Cov. Prevalence
1 Constant funding $118 million 16% 0% 2.24%
2 Universal access $307 million 80% 60% 2.26%
3 Prevention focus $242 million 44% 60% 2.18%
4 Treatment focus $270 million 80% 30% 2.32%
5 Limited funding $244 million 80% 38% 2.26%BMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S4
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words, it is critical to assess not only where HIV infections
have occurred (in terms of vulnerable subpopulations,
regional variations, etc.), but also to understand where the
next infections are likely to occur. Countries need to move
beyond the oversimplified conclusion that "everyone is at
risk", and instead truly understand whether certain sub-
populations are at greater risk than others. UNAIDS has
been supporting a series of regional activities known as
"Know Your Epidemic, Know Your Response" in which
country teams assemble information on the status of the
epidemic and their national program. The Modes of
Transmission model is applied to estimate the sources of
new infection. The results from this modeling are com-
pared to the current allocation of efforts to determine how
the response might be improved.
Next, countries need to have a clear grasp on the costs of
different interventions. In the earlier years of the epi-
demic, it may have been acceptable that countries lacked
information about a reasonable range of unit costs for a
set of prevention and treatment interventions. However,
at this stage of the epidemic, it is totally unacceptable that
countries cannot provide even a reasonable range of unit
costs for particular interventions. Where unit cost data are
not available, it should be a high priority to collect such
information. Most organizations implementing interven-
tions know their own costs, since they need to prepare
budgets to request support from funding agencies. This
information needs to be compiled systematically and
used to estimate resource requirements. This is important
not only for the purpose of allocating resources, but also
for identifying potential inefficiencies in scaled-up pro-
grams.
A key way to improve their resource-allocation process is
to integrate resource allocation into each country's entire
planning process. Most countries assess their resource
needs as a final step in the planning process, rather than
throughout the overall planning process. This is not to
suggest that the planning process should be limited by
some arbitrary financial limits. However, countries
should be encouraged to consider throughout the plan-
ning process a set of different scenarios based on assump-
tions about what level of resources may be realistically
available.
Finally, countries should design their own plan for finan-
cial sustainability. This is important because most coun-
tries today plan no further than their next budget cycle,
paying very little attention to how the priorities of donors
and governments might shift in the future. This is particu-
larly critical for countries which rely heavily on a small
number of donors (e.g., PEPFAR; Global Fund, etc.). All
plans should include contingencies to cover worst-case
scenarios, which is particularly important given the cur-
rent global financial crisis. What happens if PEPFAR fund-
ing is reduced or "flat-lined"? What happens if a country
doesn't win any further Global Fund applications? What if
the priorities of a country shift away from HIV and AIDS?
Incorporating new information into resource-allocation 
models
The future of evidence-based planning will ultimately
require that existing tools that are used to address issues of
resource allocation are greatly improved and that new
tools are developed. A critical first step in improving
resource-allocation tools involves improving knowledge
about the costs and cost-effectiveness of interventions.
Existing tools rely on an incomplete database of cost and
cost-effectiveness studies. Little is known, for example,
about the cost-effectiveness of community outreach inter-
ventions or interventions designed to reach MSM. A con-
certed global effort should be made to expand the current
literature on the cost and cost-effectiveness of HIV and
AIDS interventions, with an emphasis on providing data
that can specifically be used by policymakers as they allo-
cate resources.
It is also imperative that resource-allocation tools reflect
current knowledge about new interventions. For example,
the Goals model has recently been updated to reflect new
data regarding the effectiveness of male circumcision. As
future interventions become available (e.g., microbicides,
vaccines, etc.), resource-allocation tools need to remain
current with these new interventions.
Next, the way in which treatment and prevention are
linked remains poorly understood. For example, little is
known about the extent to which increased access to treat-
ment will affect the future incidence of HIV. It is inevitable
that as access to ART increases, the prevalence of HIV will
similarly rise. However, it is much less clear how this will
affect new HIV infections [57,58]. Further analysis should
be performed in developing countries that have had long-
term experience offering ART (e.g., Costa Rica, Brazil) to
assess how this may already be affecting HIV prevalence
and incidence.
Resource-allocation models also need to better take into
consideration synergies between interventions. Mathe-
matically, synergies are difficult to adequately model, but
the accuracy of future projections depends critically upon
the way that these models work. Experience shows that
spending large sums of money on only one intervention
is unlikely to be successful. The success of STI treatment,
for example, depends critically on the effectiveness of con-
dom distribution programs. The uptake of VCT is likely to
be strongly affected by efforts to limit stigma and discrim-
ination, and by treatment availability [59]. Increasing
government spending on vulnerable and highly stigma-BMC Public Health 2009, 9(Suppl 1):S4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/S1/S4
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tized groups (e.g., MSM) is only likely to occur if resources
are also spent on convincing political leaders about the
importance of reaching these subpopulations. Each of
these types of synergies needs to be considered in the
design of future resource-allocation tools.
There also remain areas where significant additional
research needs to be conducted. For example, little is
known about the resource-allocation strategies of coun-
tries which have been able to successfully address the HIV
and AIDS epidemic. Up until recently, the lack of such
research was understandable, given the paucity of data
about the way resources are spent and the very limited
information about the historical prevalence trends in var-
ious countries. However, at this point in time, there is an
increasing level of data about both spending and preva-
lence trends. This information should be rigorously ana-
lyzed so that countries are better able to make resource-
allocation decisions.
Conclusion
This paper was designed to challenge national policymak-
ers to consider how resource allocation is being con-
ducted, and to reevaluate how it might be pursued better
in the future. As seen from numerous countries, there are
few outstanding examples of countries which have care-
fully assessed their resources allocation strategy and acted
in a way which could be considered "evidence-based".
Furthermore, few countries have incorporated into their
own strategic planning process an assessment of financial
sustainability. Given the current global financial crisis,
countries cannot afford to ignore the issues of accounta-
bility and sustainability [8].
How can these problems be addressed? A review of cur-
rent efforts to understand and improve the resource-allo-
cation process indicates both successes and failures.
Countries have seen resource-allocation modeling as
merely another tool imposed upon them by international
donors, rather than an essential process that should be
integrated into the country's planning process. Few if any
countries have taken the opportunity to conduct resource-
allocation modeling so that they can actually shift
resources from low priority interventions to those which
are a higher priority.
However, countries such as Lesotho, Kenya and Honduras
have used resource-allocation modeling as a way to dem-
onstrate to donors the potential benefits of investing in
the country's HIV and AIDS response. Countries such as
South Africa and Ukraine have used resource-allocation
modeling as a way to increase domestic commitment and
to generate new resources. Namibia has used resource-
allocation modeling to confirm that their NSP was
severely undercosted. Uganda used modeling to provide
the information for a vigorous debate among stakeholders
about priorities for allocating scarce resources.
For the national resource-allocation process to be
improved over the long term, both countries and the glo-
bal community must move forward. Research must be
performed on costing and cost-effectiveness. Much more
is needed in terms of understanding how resource alloca-
tion has helped countries to develop an effective response,
while also understanding how poor resource-allocation
decisions have limited the impact of available resources.
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